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Abstract 
In this paper we show that rent sharing plays a role in explaining the glass ceiling 
effect. We make use of a unique employer-employee panel database for Italy from 
1996 to 2003, which allows controlling for observed individual and firm 
heterogeneity and for collective bargaining. Moreover, by means of IV quantile fixed 
effects estimates we can cope with unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. A 
discussion of different explanations is provided.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Rent Sharing, Gender Wage Gap, Glass Ceiling, Quantile Regressions. 
JEL Classification: C33, J16, J31, J41, L25. 
*Manuscript
Click here to view linked References
 2 
1. Introduction 
The glass ceiling effect is one of the stylized fact concerning the gender pay gap. One 
of the pioneering work is Albrecht, Bjorklund and Vroman (2003) that use quantile 
regressions and Swedish data finding an increasing gender pay gap along the wage 
distribution. Other papers have then extended this finding to most of the OECD 
countries (Arulamapalan et al. 2007). Although the glass ceiling phenomenon is 
observed in most OECD countries, the understanding of the reasons behind it 
represents an open field of research (Booth, 2007), with relatively few papers testing 
explanations from an empirical point of view (De la Rica et al., 2010, Bertrand and 
Hallock, 2001, among others).1  
In this paper we propose a new explanation for the glass ceiling effect, 
investigating whether men and women differ in their efficacy to extract rents from 
firms, and whether this difference increases along the wage distribution. We make 
use of a unique employer-employee panel database for Italy.  
The relation between rent-sharing and the gender wage gap has been previously 
investigated by Nekby (2003), both at the conditional mean and along the wage 
distribution.2 Nonetheless, this paper did not properly control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity, issues that have been proved to be crucial in the 
estimation of rent sharing (Abowd and Lemieux, 1993, Card et al., 2010). We can cope 
with these issues by using IV quantile fixed effects estimates.  
 
2. Data Description 
We make use of a unique panel version of the administrative employer-employee 
database provided by INPS (Italian Social Security Institute). The sample units are 
industrial and service dependent workers, both part-time (converted in full-time 
equivalent) and full-time, in standard labour market contracts (blue collars, white 
collars and managers), aged between 15 and 64 (when they first enter in the 
                                                 
1
 Bertrand and Hallock (2001) is actually related to a slightly different literature that investigates 
the behaviour of selected group of workers, such as CEO and top executives.  
2
 Also Plasman et al. (2004) investigate the impact of rent sharing on the gender pay gap. 
However, they do not address the glass ceiling phenomenon since their analysis is restricted to the 
conditional mean.  
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database), with al least two observations in the panel. We merge the INPS dataset 
with the AIDA database, which includes information on the balance sheet of (capital-
owned) firms from 1996 to 2003, in such a way restricting the sample to workers 
employed in capital owned firms.3  
Our main independent variable is quasi-rent per worker, i.e. the rents per worker 
evaluated at the opportunity cost of labour, which is defined as the revenue per 
worker (operative income –which equals to net profits- plus the wage bill), minus the 
alternative wage, as in Van Reenen (1996). 
An important value added of our matched employer-employee database concerns 
the way of computing the alternative wage, since it allows controlling accurately for 
the collective bargaining, i.e. for the part of bargaining that takes place at 
national/sectoral level and that is not related to individual negotiation. In Italy the 
collective bargaining is characterized by two levels: a first centralized (national) level 
where minimum wages for all occupations are set in all industries; a second 
decentralized level where the employer and employees (individually or at the 
firm/territorial level) can bargain over wages and other working conditions. To 
control properly for the first national level of bargaining we introduce in our 
estimation the minimum wage corresponding to the worker‘s specific national 
contract and, within the contract, to the specific occupation (―livello di 
inquadramento‖), as in Card et al. (2010). This turns out to be a more reliable measure 
of the alternative wage with respect to using average industrial wages. Since in Italy 
there are more than 200 national contracts, we restrict our sample to the greatest 26 
national contracts (80% of the total sample), to have enough variability within each 
contract-occupation cell.  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics by gender of the variables of the analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 Data on profits are deflated using the valued added deflator (base year, 2002). Further, we clean 
our data as in the following: we drop observations for which the difference in absolute value 
between the firm size reported in AIDA and the firm size reported in INPS was higher than 200 
(so doing the correlation between firm size in the two databases is 99.95), as well as extreme 
observations below (above) the 1st (99th) percentile of wages and profits per employee; we also 
drop outliers with respect to the yearly growth rate of wages and profits per employee.  
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3.  Econometric specifications and Results 
Since our analysis concerns the whole wage distribution, we make use of the quantile 
regression approach. The baseline specification is the following: 
 
 
 
where θ refers to the percentile, i to individuals, j(i,t) to the firm where the worker i is 
employed at time t, c(i,t) to the national contract the worker is subject to, s to 
industry. The dependent variable in our regressions is the (log) real gross weekly 
wage. The term I_Chari,t is a set of observed individual characteristics (age, age 
squared, tenure and occupation dummy). MWc(i,t) is the national contract minimum 
wage that controls for first level bargaining. QuasiRentsj(i,t) is quasi-rent per employee. 
Firmsizei,t is the proxy for firm heterogeneity, while φs, λa, δt  are industry, area (five 
macro-areas in Italy: Northwest, Northeast, Centre, South and Islands) and time 
dummies respectively. All the variables of interest are in logarithms and therefore we 
estimate elasticities.  
The first step of the analysis is to carry out cross sectional quantile estimates at the 
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles, separately for men and women, controlling for 
observed heterogeneity of workers and firms. From Table 2 it is possible to note that 
rent sharing estimates are greater for men, and for both men and women they are 
slightly increasing along the wage distribution. However, using cross sectional 
regressions we cannot control for the unobserved heterogeneity of workers. Hence, 
we implement quantile fixed effect estimates, as proposed by Koenker (2004). 
Estimates in Table 3 prove that, as expected, when controlling for the individual 
unobserved heterogeneity rent sharing estimates strongly dampen, consistently with 
the sorting literature (Mion and Naticchioni, 2009) and with the rent sharing 
literature (Card et al., 2010). Moreover, in fixed effects the estimates are basically flat 
both for men and women and still higher for men than for women.  
The last step in order to derive unbiased estimates is to address the endogeneity 
due to the likely simultaneous determination of wages and profits and to 
measurement errors, endogeneity that can cause a severe underestimation of rent 
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sharing (Van Reenen, 1996, Card et al. 2010). Since we are working in a quantile 
framework we apply a very recent methodology developed by Galvao and Montes-
Rojas (2009), Galvao (2011) and Harding and Lamarche (2009). This procedure is an 
extension of the IV quantile procedure of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) that 
allows for the inclusion of fixed effects as introduced in Koenker (2004). 
As instrument for firm profits we exploit the idea developed in Card et al. (2010) 
by using for each firm in a given province the average of current total real sales per 
employee of firms located in all other Italian provinces but operating in the same 
three-digit sector.4 The identifying assumption is that national industry demand 
shocks affect firm level profitability but have no direct effect on local labour 
conditions.5  
Results are shown in Table 4. As expected, the degree of underestimation of the 
fixed effects estimates is substantial. As for men, rent elasticities are quite stable along 
the wage distribution, ranging from 5.9% at the 10th percentile to 4.4% at the 90th 
percentile. For women, the extent of rent sharing is again lower than for men. 
Further, it is basically stable from the 10th percentile to the median (3.8% and 3% 
respectively), while it falls substantially at the 90th percentile (1.6%). These findings 
strongly suggest that, once controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and 
endogeneity, the rent sharing impact is such to increase the gender wage gap along 
the wage distribution, contributing to generate a glass ceiling effect.6  
                                                 
4
 To compute these averages we use weights equal to the inverse of distances between provinces: 
more weight is given to closer provinces. The weighing procedure increases the explicative power 
of the instrument. Nonetheless, similar results apply even when weights do no change with 
distance.  
5 The estimation is carried out simultaneously on three percentiles (10th, 50th, 90th) for 
computational reasons. Further, this estimation technique does not allow testing the weakness of 
instruments. The only possible check is to implement a standard IV fixed effects estimation and 
look at the F-statistic of the first stage. In our case the F-statistics are statistically significant and 
higher than the threshold value of 10 for both gender categories.   
6
 As a robustness check, instead of using the individual minimum wage as a measure of the 
alternative wage, we make use of a more standard measure used in the literature, the industrial 
wage (as in Van Reenen, 1996). This is computed as the average of individual minimum wages at 
the national contract level (each national contract roughly corresponds to a different industry). 
Results are similar from a qualitative point of view. In particular, estimates are still decreasing 
along the wage distribution both for men and women, with a more substantial drop for women at 
the top of the distribution (from 0.03 at the 10th percentile to 0.01 at the 90th percentile) than for 
men (from 0.08 to 0.07), confirming a widening of the gender wage gap at the 90th percentile.  
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To characterize further our results we analyze other factors that might play a role 
in explaining the differences in the rent sharing effect on gender pay gap. First, we 
consider a possible sorting of women into less profitable firms, pointing out that in 
our data the share of women is basically stable along the distribution of firm profits: 
women are not under represented in firms with high profits.7 Second, we take into 
account a possible occupation segregation of women. In Figure 1 we show that the 
distribution of minimum wages settled at the national level, which represent an 
excellent proxy for job quality, is basically the same between men and women from 
the median to the top of the wage distribution.8 Hence, since selection into firms and 
occupations do not differ much between men and women, our findings support 
explanations for the glass ceiling effect based on the fact that women either cannot or 
do not want to extract the same amount of rents with respect to men. This might be 
related to different explanations. In the case where women ‗cannot‘ extract more rents 
one might think either to employer discrimination, related mainly to women‘s lower 
mobility and lower outside option (Manning, 2003), or to different bargaining power 
between men and women due to cultural differences (‗women do not ask‘, as in 
Booth, 2007). In the case where women ‗do not want‘ to extract more rents, it might 
be the case that women at the top of the wage distribution prefer to bargain over 
other dimensions of benefits rather than extra wage premia, more in line with their 
familiar duties (for instance flexible working time).  
These findings are consistent from a qualitative point of view to those of De La 
Rica et al. (2010), who find that the gender pay gap takes place mainly in the part of 
compensations associated to performance pay schemes, especially in the upper tail of 
the distribution, i.e. glass ceiling effect. Their findings support an explanation based 
on the existence of monopsonistic features, possibly related to women´s lower 
                                                 
7
 Dividing the observations in quartiles of the firm profits distribution, the share of women is 
about 34% if the first quartile, 28% in the second, 26% in the third, and 29% in the forth.  
8
 Note that  by using the INPS database we are not able to  control for another relevant issue, the 
selection of women concerning the choice of participating in the labour market, since we do not 
have inactive individuals in the database. However, it is also important to stress that participation 
decisions are more an issue for unskilled women, since skilled women (at the 90th percentile) have 
a much higher opportunity cost. For this reason, we argue that while self selection in participation 
decisions plays in general a role for women, this effect should be less important for skilled women, 
which represent the focus of our analysis. Furthermore, there are also methodological difficulties 
in introducing participation decisions: to the best of our knowledge there is no methodology 
allowing integrating self selection issues into an IV quantile fixed effect framework. 
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mobility due to their attachment to household tasks (Manning, 2003). Our approach 
differs from a performance pay approach since we isolate the impact of firm profits 
and rent sharing on the gender wage gap, while not considering the other component 
of performance pay9. It is anyway interesting that two similar but different 
approaches provide analogous explanations of the glass ceiling phenomenon.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
Few explanations are provided for the glass ceiling effect. In this paper we make use 
of a unique matched employer-employee database to show that even after controlling 
for first level bargaining, sorting and endogeneity, there is a different degree of rent 
sharing between men and women that increases along the wage distribution, 
entailing a glass ceiling effect. A discussion of different explanations is provided.   
                                                 
9 In fact, performance pay schemes might be related to firm profits as well as to various other 
features, such as individual incentives adopted by firms that are not necessarily related to firm 
profits, especially in the short term. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
     
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables of the Analysis
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Log Real Weekly Wage 6.02 0.28 5.91 0.25
Log Real Minimum Weekly Wage 5.53 0.12 5.52 0.13
Age 37.00 9.79 35.82 9.51
Age Squared 1464.65 765.47 1373.61 728.73
Tenure 0-1 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48
Tenure 2-9 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50
Tenure >9 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38
Blue Collar 0.71 0.45 0.44 0.50
White Collar and Manager 0.29 0.45 0.56 0.50
Log Firm Size 4.41 1.49 4.42 1.54
Log Quasi Rent per Employee 2.76 0.91 2.62 1.05
dNorth East 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46
dNorth West 0.41 0.49 0.46 0.50
dCentre 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37
dSouth 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23
dIsland 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.14
Number of National Contracts 26 26
Number of observations 131,300 55,417
Number of groups 32,921 14,482
Source: Panel ISFOL on INPS-AIDA data. 
Women Men
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q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Ln Quasi Rent 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.048***
Ln Minimum Wage 1.414*** 1.539*** 1.667*** 1.723*** 1.659***
Age 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.014***
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Tenure 2-9 0.041*** 0.030*** 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.008***
Tenure >10 0.075*** 0.057*** 0.038*** 0.028*** 0.021***
White Collar and Manager 0.031*** 0.037*** 0.058*** 0.086*** 0.123***
ln Firm Size 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.009***
Const -2.513*** -3.127*** -3.741*** -3.970*** -3.539***
R
2 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.42
Ln Quasi Rent 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.028***
Ln Minimum Wage 1.285*** 1.373*** 1.512*** 1.639*** 1.719***
Age 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.001
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Tenure 2-9 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.007*** 0.0000
Tenure >10 0.061*** 0.051*** 0.033*** 0.018*** 0.0000
White Collar and Manager 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.047*** 0.075***
ln Firm Size 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.013***
Const -1.679*** -2.154*** -2.852*** -3.457*** -3.782***
R2 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.43
Men
Women
Table 2: Cross Sectional Quantile  Regressions of Wages on Quasi Rents
Notes: ***,** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely. Estimates all include area,
time, and sector dummies. For Men (Women) 131,300 (55,417) observations for 32,921 (14,482)
individuals.
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q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
ln Quasi Rent 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.015***
ln Minimum Wage 0.981*** 0.964*** 0.957*** 0.973*** 1.003***
Age 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.006* 0.003
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Tenure 2-9 0.042*** 0.023 0.007*** 0.006 -0.019*
Tenure >9 0.042*** 0.021 0.003** -0.009 -0.031***
White Collar and Manager 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.0032*** 0.034*** 0.042***
ln Firm Size 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013***
Const 2.999 3.177 3.293 3.296 3.245
ln Quasi Rent 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008***
ln Minimum Wage 0.950*** 0.923*** 0.920*** 0.937*** 0.978***
Age -0.001 0.0000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.004
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Tenure 2-9 0.038*** 0.025* 0.012*** 0.0010 -0.009
Tenure >10 0.037** 0.0230 0.010** -0.003 -0.023
White Collar and Manager 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004
ln Firm Size 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013***
Const 4.682 4.882 4.973 4.941 4.826
Table 3: Quantile Fixed Effects Regressions of Wages on Quasi Rents
Men
Women
Notes: ***,** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely. Estimates all include area,
time, and sector dummies. For Men (Women) 131,300 (55,417) observations for 32,921 (14,482)
individuals.
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q10 q50 q90
ln Quasi Rent 0.059*** 0.047*** 0.044***
ln Minimum Wage 0.979*** 0.961*** 1.003***
Age 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.003***
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Tenure 2-9 0.042*** 0.008*** -0.017***
Tenure >9 0.043*** 0.004*** -0.031***
White Collar and Manager 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.046***
ln Firm Size 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015***
Const 2.452*** 2.750*** 2.734***
ln Quasi Rent 0.038*** 0.030*** 0.016***
ln Minimum Wage 0.917*** 0.902*** 0.992***
Age -0.001*** -0.000 -0.004***
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Tenure 2-9 0.037*** 0.012*** -0.008***
Tenure >10 0.036*** 0.009*** -0.022***
White Collar and Manager 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.006***
ln Firm Size 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016***
Const 3.659*** 3.878*** 3.601***
Women
Notes: ***,** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely. Estimates all
include area, time, and sector dummies. For Men (Women) 131,300 (55,417)
observations for 32,921 (14,482) individuals.
Table 4: IV Quantile Fixed Effects Regressions of Wages on Quasi
Rents
Men
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Figure 1: Distribution of Minimum Wages by Gender
 
